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Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the American military establishment feverishly 
debated the notion of a coming “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) understood as an 
imminent transformation in the conduct of warfare brought about by new technologies such 
as precision-guided munitions and information and telecommunication technologies. Its most 
vocal proponents (Cohen 1996; Owens 2001) predicted a new era of military superiority for 
the United States if it grasped this epochal opportunity and modernised its armed forces 
accordingly. The performance of a putatively information-age military in the wars of the 
twenty-first century has however proven to be much less auspicious, particularly where it has 
involved confrontation with diffuse and resilient armed insurgencies. Excitable discussions of 
a revolution in military affairs and an associated military doctrine of network-centric warfare 
(Cebrowski and Gartska 1998) have accordingly become much more muted in recent years. 
Yet simultaneously the new figure of the drone aircraft, a weapons system drawing upon 
RMA technologies, has become the object of insistent debate and frequently seen as 
heralding the dawn of a new era of robotic warfare (Singer 2009). 
 
That there exists an intimate link between technology and warfare is a claim that can hardly 
be disputed. Such a relationship is all the more salient when we consider a twentieth century 
in which was realised an unprecedented mobilisation of industrialised societies for the 
purpose of waging armed conflict, not least with regard to their scientific and engineering 
resources. From these efforts have followed the global deployment of motorised forces on 
land, at sea and in the air, the development of the atomic bomb and the harnessing of the 
electromagnetic spectrum for lightspeed telecommunications and the extension of perception 
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beyond the natural bounds of the human organism. On the basis of this potent relationship, 
many commentators have come to the view that technology is the central determinant of 
military power and that one can trace major transformations in the practices of warfare to the 
emergence of key technological innovations. Already in the 1950s, the historian Michael 
Roberts contended that the introduction of portable firearms had induced a radical change in 
military tactics and strategy in the sixteenth century (and thereby occasioned the rise of the 
modern state), bequeathing the very term of “military revolution” that has since gained 
common currency (Roberts 1967). 
 
As seductive and compelling as such accounts of the primary causative power of technology 
may appear, they typically rest on simplistic and selective treatments of the historical record, 
as several of Roberts’s professional colleagues have been keen to underline (Gifford 1995; 
Black 2008). At a more fundamental level, such perspectives are vitiated by impoverished 
understandings of technology and the nature of technical change. As reviewers of Geoffrey 
Parker’s expanded version of Robert’s original thesis (Parker 1988) put it, technology is all 
too often treated “as a ‘black box,’ a primary explanans whose nature is itself inexplicable” 
(Hall and De Vries 1990: 506). The import of such debates is not restricted to the arbitration 
of historiographical controversies since the ways in which we conceptualise technology and 
its relation to the conduct of war is essential to any assessment of a contemporary RMA and 
its possible geopolitical ramifications, and beyond it of the relation between technology and 
conflict more generally. 
 
This chapter will argue for the necessity of a series of theoretical and methodological moves 
for the development of a richer comprehension of the role of technology in war. In the first 
instance, the chapter will propose a conceptual framework that can overcome the limitations 
of approaches to the RMA that treat technology and society as two distinct domains, putting 
the analysis of technology and war on a stronger intellectual footing by drawing upon a 
theory of assemblages that does not insist on such a rigid delineation of technology and 
society. Having done so, it will outline and seek to problematise three common conceptions 
of military technology found in both popular and academic accounts of warfare. Finally, the 
chapter will argue that while technological developments are significantly impacting 
contemporary military practice - if rarely with the clear, unambiguous effects hoped by their 
keenest proponents - the RMA can only be adequately grasped by reference to the wider 
sociotechnical milieu in which they are taking place. 
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Opening up the Black Box of the War Machine  
 
If we are to overcome the limitations of many existing accounts of technology in war, it is 
essential to lay a strong theoretical and methodological foundation upon which original 
analyses can be built. Drawing upon the perspective outlined in the first half of this volume, 
an essential first step must be an obstinate commitment to resist any firm delineation between 
society and technology according to which one can simply be read from the other as in 
various brands of technological determinism or social constructivism. Following Bruno 
Latour (1999:214), it must be resolutely affirmed that “we are sociotechnical animals and 
each human interaction is sociotechnical.” 
 
To this end, the present chapter proposes to deploy a theory of assemblages as first elaborated 
in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari 2003) and which 
recently has been garnering increasing attention in the social sciences, including International 
Relations (DeLanda 2006; Marcus and Saka 2006; Acuto and Curtis 2013; Bachmann and al. 
2014). The concept of the assemblage – a close cousin to ANT’s ‘networks’ - refers to any 
collection of heterogeneous elements that can be said be display some form of consistency 
and regularity while remaining open to transformative change through the addition or 
subtraction of elements or the reorganisation of the relations between those elements. Thus, 
concrete assemblages can be seen to cut across the various ideational and material domains 
that are usually analytically delineated, thereby eschewing the search for causal determinisms 
between them to privilege the systemic interactions and co-dependencies that constitute such 
assemblages.  
 
Assemblage theory is applicable across all areas of social and political life. Regarding its 
implications for our understanding of technology, Deleuze and Guattari (2003: 397) argue 
that  
 
the principle behind all technology is to demonstrate that a technical element 
remains abstract, entirely undetermined, as long as one does not relate it to an 
assemblage it presupposes. It is the machine that is primary in relation to the 
technical element: not the technical machine, itself a collection of elements, but 
the social or collective machine, the machinic assemblage that determines what is 
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a technical assemblage at a given moment, what is its usage, extension, 
comprehension, etc.
1
  
 
The above passage makes clear that a technical object is always inserted into broader 
assemblages that determine its mode of production, the value attributed to it, its distribution 
in the social field, and its employment, none of which are intrinsic features of the object. 
While technical objects are typically designed and refined with particular uses in minds, these 
uses are never exhausted by the intentionality of their creators and objects are always liable to 
being repurposed as they enter into different assemblages. A simple example would be that of 
a machete which can just as well be employed for chopping the branches of a tree as for the 
hacking of human limbs. Such a dual use might perhaps be dismissed as banal given the 
understood purpose of machetes for the action of cutting but more surprising and unforeseen 
appropriations can also occur. For example, a passenger aircraft normally inserted in a 
transport assemblage whose function is to carry goods and bodies from one point to another 
along repeatable paths takes on a radically different character when wielded as a missile 
hurled against a building. Strictly identical technical objects can therefore dramatically alter 
their meaning and effectivity in the world when detached from the assemblages that 
conferred to them their original usages and meanings. 
 
Of course, the technical object is also an assemblage in its own right, composed of 
heterogeneous parts and specific functional relations between these parts that we must also be 
attentive to since they exert their own influence on the wider field of social assemblages. A 
comprehensive understanding of a technical object therefore also requires that its history and 
genesis be grasped so as to draw out the co-evolution of its parts. Successful technical objects 
typically undergo a process whereby early designs in which each constitutive internal element 
serves a single purpose in a linear causal chain progressively develop into more internally 
coherent schemes in which their parts take on several functions that mutually support the 
operation of one another and enter into multiple relations of reciprocal causality. As they do 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note that the reference to a “social machine” here is not premised on the notion of a priorly 
constituted entity of “the social” that would shape at will technology or any other “non-social” realm. Within a 
theory of assemblages, there is no totality of the social, only social assemblages that already combine bodies, 
material, machines, discourse, and so on. 
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so, the forms of technical objects tend to stabilise and their designs can remain fixed for 
extended periods of time.
2
 
 
This point can be illustrated with reference to the development of firearms. The muzzle-
loaded musket widely adopted by the European armies of the eighteenth century employed a 
flintlock mechanism in which a hammer holding a piece of flint strikes the steel of the flash 
pan and produces a spark igniting the priming powder that in turn triggers the detonation of 
the main gunpowder load and causes the weapon to discharge. After each shot, the operator 
of the musket would then have to reload the weapon from the muzzle end with gunpowder, 
bullet and wadding, prime the flash pan with some more gunpowder and cock the hammer of 
the flintlock before taking aim again. In this primitive incarnation, each element of the 
firearm served a simple purpose in a linear chain with human intervention required to restore 
the technical object to a functional condition and address all the changes in the state of the 
object that are by-products of its operation and prevent its immediate reuse.  
 
The flintlock mechanism
3
 was eventually replaced by the percussion cap in the mid-
nineteenth century, paving the way for the modern breech-loaded cartridge in which bullet, 
gunpowder, and primer are all combined within a single metallic casing. Starting with the 
invention of the Maxim gun in 1884, firearm technology then saw the development of semi-
automatic or fully automatic designs that use the recoil or a portion of the gases propelling 
the bullet from the barrel to automatically eject the spent cartridge, load a new cartridge into 
the breech, and ready the weapon for a new discharge, these operations all performed 
virtually simultaneously. Although a wide range of semi-automatic and automatic weapons 
exist, these basic principles of firearm operation have remained practically unchanged for a 
hundred years, suggesting a high degree of optimisation in the harnessing of the physical 
laws governing the functioning of such devices.  
 
                                                 
2
 This analysis is indebted to the French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon (1989, 2011). See also 
Boever and al. (2012). For related ideas from a Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) perspective, see 
chapter two.  
3
 The flintlock mechanism was itself already a more integrated ignition mechanism than the earlier matchlock 
which lowered a slow-burning match to the flash pan, the lid of which had to be manually lifted by the operator. 
The flintlock mechanism dispensed with the need for a live match and used a protruding section of the flash pan 
called the frieze which, upon being struck by the hammer, would provide the spark for ignition as well as lift the 
lid of the pan and expose the priming powder to the spark, all within a single movement. 
  
6 
 
It is generally in this state of internal coherence that the technical object is at its most 
versatile and flexible in its applications, requiring limited intervention into its workings by its 
users and able to operate relatively autonomously from other technical objects. Such a 
technical object can therefore be much more easily detached from any given assemblage and 
reintegrated into a new one than is the case with an unstable technical object still in the midst 
of its evolutionary genesis, more heavily dependent on the mesh of sociotechnical relations 
that sustain it, and correspondingly exigent in terms of the conditions necessary for its 
successful operation. To take examples at the two ends of that spectrum, one could contrast 
the versatility, ease of use, and widespread diffusion of the AK-47 Kalashnikov rifle (more 
on which below) with the F-35 fighter jet and its long list of costly operational requirements 
including bespoke runways, software integration, and specialist training. 
 
When tracking the emergence and evolution of technical objects, it is also important to 
recognise the extent to which these have become increasingly intertwined with specific 
understandings of the natural world and its physical properties. Modern technology is 
intimately tied to the emergence of a scientific worldview pursuing a systematic empirical 
interrogation of nature from which are derived mathematical laws and regularities that permit 
the elaboration and optimisation of the contraptions that rely on them. Conversely, technical 
artefacts allow for the isolation of natural forces necessary for their scientific study. If we are 
to better understand the workings of technology in our contemporary societies, it is therefore 
incumbent upon us to trace the articulation of scientific ideas and discourses, materiality of 
technique, and social practice that might best be referred to as technoscience (Pickering 
1995; Ihde and Selinger 2003). Indeed, it is to this very nexus that we must attend when 
assessing claims of an overarching revolution in military affairs and determining the role that 
the information technologies cherished by RMA enthusiasts actually play in the wars of the 
twenty-first century. For now, however, we must attend to three problematic conceptions that 
abound within existing accounts of the role of technology in war but which we can now begin 
to unpick with the help of the conceptual framework just outlaid.  
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Three Shortcomings in Discussions of Technology and War 
 
The first of the common problems affecting discursive treatments of technology in war is the 
disproportionate attention paid to weaponry. Such bias is easy enough to account for by the 
intimate relation of weapons to the sharp end activity of war and the particular fascination 
that firearms, jet aircraft, or nuclear bombs seem to exert on the public at wide. However, it is 
no less misleading for it, all the more as we consider increasingly industrialised and 
technologically-intensive armed forces. For one, the focus on eye-catching weaponry 
generally results in a neglect of other technologies, some of which may at first appear quite 
mundane but that can credibly be said to have played as important a role as any weapon 
system in the development of warfare. One might for instance think of the technology of food 
canning and legitimately query whether the vast static fronts of the First World War could 
have been sustained for so long without the means for the preservation and transport of 
inexpensive high-calorie nutrition. Another example can be found in the discovery of 
penicillin whose anti-bacterial properties saved countless lives and limbs of injured soldiers 
at risk of infection, restoring many of them to duty and thereby sustaining combat power.
4
 
 
A further problem with a narrow focus on weaponry is that it overlooks the crucial role of 
logistics in supplying fighting units with the materiel (such as food, fuel, ammunition or 
medical equipment) they could not operate without.
5
 Logistics has long constituted a major 
part of military operations but has only become more complex and indispensable as armies 
have become more technologically sophisticated. Indeed, it has been widely observed that the 
level of resources or personnel allocated to support roles relative to the actual combat forces 
they enable (the so-called “tooth-to-tail ratio”) has steadily increased over time such that the 
former now outnumber the latter by a scale of as much as ten to one in the most advanced 
militaries.  
 
A fundamental but often occluded truth comes to the fore when we relax the primacy 
generally accorded to weaponry in accounts of technology in war and allow for a 
                                                 
4
 Much the same could be said of the assorted techniques of blood transfusion that developed during the Second 
World War, see Grove (2015). On the long-standing entanglement of armed conflict and medicine, see Larner 
et. al (2008). 
5
 The paucity of general academic accounts of military logistics is revealing in this regard with Van Creveld 
(2004) and Lynn (1993) standing as rare exceptions. For a more general treatment of logistics that traces its 
historical entanglement of military operations and business management as well as explore its present role in 
global manifestations of violence, see Cowan (2014). 
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consideration of the role of other technical innovations and a tracing of the larger logistical 
chains in which any given technology is inserted. That is to say, no technical object exists in 
isolation of the wider sociotechnical systems within which it is produced, distributed, 
sustained and put to use. Such dependencies are in fact typically all the more dense and 
fragile the more functionally integrated technical objects are with each other. Accounts that 
isolate particular technical objects from these dependencies in order to attribute to them a 
primary causative role are accordingly vulnerable not only to charges of arbitrariness but also 
of resting on a simplistic understanding of both social and technical change. 
 
Indeed, an even more fundamental problem lies in the persistent technological determinism 
that subtends so many discussions of technology within military affairs. Although such a 
stance is rarely explicitly theorised or defended, major developments in the conduct of war 
along with success and failure in particular military exchanges are routinely and uncritically 
attributed to certain key technologies. As prominent a military strategist as J.F.C. Fuller thus 
does not hesitate to assert that “tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered, 
form 99 per cent of victory” (Fuller 1998: 31). All too often, technologies are treated as dei 
ex machina that seemingly appear from nowhere and induce major transformations in the 
conditions of war. In such accounts, changes in tactics and organisational arrangements are 
frequently understood as merely subsequent adjustments to a new technological reality. 
Where social and cultural variables are considered, they are generally restricted to assessing 
the extent to which military institutions, so often decried for their supposedly innate 
conservatism, are able to adapt to this new landscape of war. Thus we find Phillips 
bemoaning the fact that his fellow military historians are “obsessed with technology as the 
primary determinate of causation within their discipline” (Phillips 2002: 40). 
 
The limitations of technologically determinist accounts are perhaps best illustrated by 
reference to a specific example and here the medieval historian Lynn White and his so-called 
“stirrup thesis” (White 1962) can provide a useful case study to think through the issues at 
stake. In a collection of essays on medieval technology, White famously develops the claim 
that the emergence of the feudal order can be traced back to the introduction of the stirrup in 
horse-riding. White’s starting point is that the new technology transformed the practice of 
war by permitting the effective use of the lance in a charge (since the impact of such a charge 
would no longer unseat the rider), thereby making the horseman the new dominant unit on the 
European battlefield in what could retrospectively be construed as a revolution in military 
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affairs. Society consequently turned to the production of mounted knights, whose elevated 
cost in terms of equipment and training entailed the formation of a class of largely 
autonomous landed warriors. From this, White claimed, had sprung the feudal period and the 
different cultural forms that characterised it, such as those associated with ideas of chivalry. 
 
White’s arguments generated a great deal of controversy among medieval historians and his 
chronology was subsequently heavily criticised but, for our purposes, it is the more general 
charge of technological determinism laid at White’s feet that interests us most. It is true that 
the precise origin of the stirrup is not known, and its identification is further complicated by 
the fact that design and function evolved substantially from earlier single mounting aids to 
paired riding stirrups connected to a saddle. Reliable representations of horse riders equipped 
with stirrups can nevertheless be dated back to China in the first centuries of the Common 
Era and there is some evidence that the earliest forms can be traced as far back as the 
Assyrians in 850 BCE. What is known with greater certainty is that the stirrup was introduced 
to Europe by the Avars around 600 CE as they were pushed westwards under pressure from 
the Turks, eventually leading to a growing European adoption in the eighth and ninth 
centuries. Crucial to the present discussion of technological determinism is the glaring fact 
that the stirrup was widely available and put to use in the practice of warfare in many 
different parts of the world yet only in Europe did it become associated with feudal forms of 
social organisation.
6
  
 
Albert Dien (1986) has notably shown how the earlier introduction of the stirrup in China and 
the concomitant rise of cavalry was not accompanied by feudalism there because of the 
greater strength and reach of the imperial state. Whereas in Europe it was necessary to parcel 
political authority down to regional levels in order to procure the required mounted units, the 
advanced Chinese bureaucracy was able to administer the central recruitment of military 
resources without extensive delegations of power to middlemen. In their discussion of 
technology, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari 2003) also explicitly 
cite White, acknowledging that the stirrup did constitute a novel type of weapon system 
through a closer binding of man and horse but simultaneously resisting the attribution of any 
causal pre-eminence to the technical object since the forms and usage of this new assemblage 
                                                 
6
 On the role of technological diffusion from the East in European development see Hobson (2004).  
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varied according to the broader social milieu in which it was inserted. “The stirrup,” they tell 
us,  
 
occasioned a new figure of the man-horse assemblage, entailing a new type of 
lance and new weapons, and this man-horse-stirrup constellation is itself variable, 
and has different effects depending on whether it is bound up with the general 
conditions of nomadism, or later readapted to the sedentary conditions of 
feudalism. (2003: 399).  
 
The stirrup did indeed allow for the formation of a novel and effective combat system in 
cavalry but this effectiveness was  only relative to the other contemporary means of war, and 
the forms of its manifestation were multiple. So while European societies produced mounted 
knights that would conduct charges for shock effect, Asian nomads privileged mounted 
archery, using the stirrup to stabilise their aim (Hildinger 2001). Thus the cases of both the 
Chinese and nomadic appropriations of the stirrup underline that it is only under the specific 
conditions of European sedentary societies that it can be said to have participated in the 
development of feudalism.  
 
We should therefore resist the seductive resort to technological developments as the unique, 
or even principal, causal force from which we can directly derive changes in social 
arrangements. As we have seen with the stirrup, we cannot draw any simple line from the 
introduction of a technical object to a particular way of fighting, let alone to wider socio-
economic transformations. This is not to say that the specificities of individual technologies 
are irrelevant or that we can satisfy ourselves with the adoption of the view that technology is 
merely the second-order emanation of social forces or human intentionality. Such a move 
would be tantamount to merely lurching from one explanatory pole to another when in fact it 
is the strict dichotomy between technology and society that must itself be brought into 
question.  
 
The last shortcoming in both popular and academic accounts of technology and war that we 
must consider is the tendency to focus on the latest technical developments involving 
contraptions reliant on the most recent scientific discoveries and feats of engineering. The 
eagerness with which the RMA and drones have been seized upon and invested with 
portentous significance for the future of war is exemplary of such a bias. Material objects 
thought of as cruder and less ‘advanced’ in terms of their sophistication and functional 
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complexity are thereby frequently neglected, even where their present impact in the world is 
considerably greater. 
 
 An emphatic example of such a military technology is the AK-47 assault rifle, most 
commonly known as the Kalashnikov after its Russian inventor. First produced in 1947 and 
adopted as standard equipment by the Soviet armed forces and most of its Warsaw Pact allies 
during the Cold War, the Kalashnikov is arguably the most influential weapon active in 
armed conflicts across the globe (Chivers 2010). Available for less than a hundred dollars in 
some parts of the world, the AK-47 may lack the accuracy or power of later rifle models but 
retains enduring appeal for its ruggedness, reliability, and ease of use and maintenance. The 
weapon of choice of the insurgent, revolutionary, terrorist, and organised criminal as well as 
still in widespread use by state militaries, the Kalashnikov has acquired a rare iconic status, 
represented prominently on the national flag of Mozambique, the coat of arms of Zimbabwe 
and East Timor, and the banners of such armed groups as Hezbollah and the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard. In its multiple variants and imitations, it accounts for no less than 
twenty percent of the estimated 500 million firearms in circulation around the world today. 
As such, the AK-47 is far and away the most deadly weapon system around, killing more 
every year than all existing tanks, aircraft and ships combined.  
 
The humble but lethal Kalashnikov draws our attention to the fact that the notion of 
technology covers not merely the so-called cutting edge of technique (often referred to by the 
nebulous term of high-tech) but rather the much wider gamut of material objects through 
which human collectives are assembled and interact with both the natural world and each 
other. Since a new technology is typically expensive to procure, consequently scarce, prone 
to malfunction, and reliant on specially trained producers and users, the initial reach of its 
direct influence is likely to be limited. Generally speaking, the full social impact of a 
technology is therefore only truly felt at the point of widespread adoption, if it occurs at all.
7
 
Such an adoption is itself liable to be determined as much, if not more so, by considerations 
of cost, reliability, and ease of use and maintenance than by its performance in ideal 
conditions. 
                                                 
7
 Any catalogue of successful and influential technical innovations would unquestionably be dwarfed by the 
litany of mostly forgotten failures and dead-ends that have followed from not only obviously flawed or 
impractical designs but also the inability of otherwise functional technical objects to secure a sufficient 
constituency of users due to unpropitious economic, social or cultural conditions. It is hence not uncommon to 
see previously unsuccessful technologies rediscovered and prospering several decades after their original 
conception. 
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An equally illuminating case study is provided by the improvised explosive device (IED), a 
non-standardised bomb assembled from available materials that has become a particularly 
prized weapon in the arsenal of insurgent groups opposing more conventional armed forces. 
In the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, IEDs are estimated to have caused around two-
thirds of coalition casualties, prompting the Pentagon to expend billions on combating a 
device produced for as little as thirty dollars.
8
 The particularity of the IED as a technical 
object is that all its incarnations share in common certain key functional components of 
trigger, detonating fuse, explosive charge, and container but these elements instantiate 
themselves in each case from a vast array of disparate objects cobbled together and 
repurposed by the artisan bomb-maker. Explosive charges range from artillery shells and 
military or industry grade high explosives to homemade explosives concocted from fertilisers 
and household chemicals while the mechanisms available to either automatically or remotely 
trigger the detonation include timers, infrared heat sensors, pressure plates, wires, and the 
radio signals emitted by garage door openers or mobile phones. The IED is thus a highly 
polymorphous technical object, its endless mutations further spurred by the countermeasures 
deployed against it. Among the most ingenious of developments we find the removal of any 
metallic components liable to be picked up by detectors or the adoption of trigger sensors 
tuned to the very radio frequencies emitted by coalition devices for jamming earlier instances 
of radio-controlled IEDs.  
  
The IED, in its accelerated and highly improvised manifestation, illustrates a more general 
mutability of the technical object that co-evolves alongside the wider socio-cultural 
ensembles within which it is inserted. It furthermore underlines the open-ended functionality 
of technical objects such that they can always be repurposed and recombined to produce new 
ensembles beyond the intentions of their original designers. Armed conflict is undoubtedly a 
particularly potent accelerant for technological evolution, concentrating minds and resources 
and subject to an intense dynamic of action-reaction between belligerents that singularly 
spurs innovation. It is therefore not surprising that so many influential technological 
developments of the last hundred years can be traced back to military efforts, from nuclear 
energy and the computer to rocketry and satellite geo-positioning. In fact, it is precisely this 
intimate relation between war and technoscientific innovation that underlies the claims of an 
                                                 
8
 By 2010, the U.S. military had spent over $17 billion dollars on IED counter-measures, excluding the even 
higher expenditure occasioned by the procurement of reinforced armoured vehicles (Higginbotham 2010).  
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epochal revolution in military affairs that became ever more insistent at the turn of the 
twenty-first century and which we can now submit to critical scrutiny.  
 
 
Technoscientific War in the ‘Information Age’ 
 
The question of whether a revolution in military affairs is afoot is one that cannot be 
addressed through the fine-grained analysis of specific technical objects proposed above 
since it pertains to a very broad thesis of a transformation in the technological basis of war. 
To the extent that a common technological genus can be identified to the trends encompassed 
under the label of the RMA, this putative upheaval in the conduct of armed conflict is being 
attributed to the proliferation of information and communication technologies. From the 
outset, it must be affirmed that such a general grouping covers so wide an array of concrete 
technical objects that any claims of predictable and well-delineated effects, above all the 
assurance of military and geopolitical primacy, should be treated with circumspection.  
 
An analogy can be drawn with the advent of military aviation, surely one of the most 
significant developments of the last century in opening up a whole new spatial dimension to 
warfighting (Adey 2010; Van Creveld 2011). While contingent on the application of the 
internal combustion engine to heavier-than-air aircraft, no simple line can be drawn from the 
appearance of powered flight to definite military uses that have been shaped as much by 
political decisions, doctrinal statements, bureaucratic institutions, and tactical schemes as by 
the available state of aviation technology. Indeed, the various development paths taken by 
aircraft have been heavily influenced by their intended purposes even if not strictly beholden 
to them. A plethora of fixed-wing and rotary-wing designs have been produced to fulfil such 
diverse roles as ground support, air-to-air combat, aerial bombardment, troop transport, 
reconnaissance and surveillance, or command and control, all of which have been further 
integrated into wider tactical and strategic schemes such as blitzkrieg, strategic bombing, and 
air mobility. If mastery of the air is therefore manifestly a major component of military power 
today, the operational uses to which it has been put are manifold and necessarily related to 
the conduct of war in its other dimensions.  Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the 
exercise of airpower has failed to reliably deliver the decisive outcomes its most fervent 
proponents have imagined for it (Hippler 2013; Pape 1996). 
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Information and communication technology has similarly (and often in combination with 
airpower) been embraced in some quarters as a panacea, fuelling enraptured visions of 
omniscience and omnipotence on the battlefield. Already in 1969, General William 
Westmoreland, head of command for American military operations in Vietnam, could 
prophesise the arrival within a decade of the “automated battlefield” in which “an integrated 
area control system that exploits the advanced technology of communications, sensors, fire 
direction, and the required automatic data processing” would allow “enemy forces [to] be 
located, tracked, and targeted almost instantaneously” with “first round kill probabilities 
approaching certainty” (Westmoreland 1969). Towards the end of the seventies, spurred by 
Soviet discussions of a “military-technical revolution”, elements of the Pentagon led by the 
influential strategist Andrew Marshall began to theorise technologically-driven changes in the 
character of warfare that would come to be referred to as the revolution in military affairs 
(Krepinevich 2002). By the nineties and the emboldening success of the First Gulf War, the 
notion of an RMA had diffused widely, prompting giddy declarations that new technologies 
were on the verge of granting military commanders “an omniscient view of the battlefield in 
real time, by day and night, and in all weather conditions” and allow for the delivery of “the 
coup de grace in a single blow” (Owens 2000: 14). We can recognise here the insistent 
recurrence of what Paul Virilio has referred to as “the will to see all, to know all, at every 
instant, everywhere, the will to universalised illumination: a scientific version of the eye of 
God which would forever rule out the surprise, the accident, the irruption of the unforeseen” 
(Virilio 1994: 70).   
 
As suggested by Virilio, such dreams of power may be ancient but their modern incarnation 
is to be understood by reference to a contemporary scientific worldview, and in particular to 
an informational episteme that has been recasting our understanding of nature, society, and 
human subjectivity as processes of informational exchange. Although prior antecedents can 
be traced (Mindell 2003), the crucible of this worldview most clearly lies in the Second 
World War in which the first computers were assembled and the modern foundations of the 
information sciences were laid (Galison 1994; Hayles 1999). Receiving further impetus from 
the intense superpower rivalry of the Cold War that saw computation and networking 
technologies increasing deployed throughout the military (Edwards 1997; Bousquet 2008a), 
this informational paradigm has firmly established itself as the technoscientific regime of our 
time. Notions of the rise of an information society qualitatively distinct from its predecessors 
  
15 
 
have accordingly become common currency within both popular and academic discourse 
(Bell 1973; Toffler 1980; Hardt and Negri 2000) with Manuel Castells’s pronouncement that 
“networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies” (Castells 2000: 500) 
succinctly expressing the contemporary credo. 
 
The American military enthusiastically embraced this view in the 1990s, producing a doctrine 
of “network-centric warfare” (NCW) that purported to achieve “information superiority” and 
“full spectrum dominance” (Alberts and al. 2002). Taking inspiration from the non-linear 
sciences of chaos and complexity, this latest version of the RMA argued for a 
decentralisation of command that would grant the various constituents of the armed forces a 
capability for self-organisation and unparalleled operational flexibility (Bousquet 2008b, 
2009). By the onset of the War on Terror, the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was 
keenly promoting an agenda of “transformation” requiring a “leap into the information age” 
and the establishment of a new “set of interconnections” that would allow small, nimble 
forces to outperform more numerous non-networked opponents (Rumsfeld 2001, 2002). 
 
Yet the translation from grandiose rhetoric to prosaic reality proved itself to be considerably 
more challenging. Initial successes in Afghanistan and Iraq at the turn of the century gave 
way to protracted and indecisive campaigns in which much of the supposed technological 
superiority of Western militaries was negated by determined insurgencies that made use of 
commercially available technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet to organise but 
never relied on them exclusively (Shachtman 2007). The aura of network-centric warfare 
dimmed accordingly, its terminology quietly dropped in the latter half of the 2000s (Guha 
2016).
9
 
 
This is not to say that information and communication technologies are not significantly 
altering the landscape of armed conflict, or even that elements of the RMA vision have not 
been realised. The present ability to survey the battlespace and persistently track entities 
within it is truly unprecedented. The precision with which munitions can be delivered to any 
                                                 
9
 The drawn-out conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq occasioned a revival of counter-insurgency doctrine (COIN) 
that denoted a shift away from NCW’s emphasis on high-tempo operations and kinetic force to the management 
of populations and winning of “hearts and minds.” Crucially, however, COIN continued to make extensive use 
of information and communication technologies, notably in the production of biometric databases of local 
populations and the computer modelling of societal dynamics (Ansorge 2015). 
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point of the globe to devastating effect is increasing all the time.
10
 The digitisation and 
networking of armed forces is continuing apace, driving both automation and an increasingly 
tight cybernetic integration of humans and machines (Coker 2013; Holmqvist 2013; Wilcox 
2015). All these developments are significant and certainly merit thorough analysis, but the 
claims of military superiority and strategic pre-eminence attached to them remain to date 
unsubstantiated.    
 
The RMA is not best understood, however, as a thesis on the future development of war 
whose validity is to be assessed. For the reasons outlined above, it is too broad and general a 
thesis to withstand any sustained probing and we are better served by a more careful and 
detailed analysis of specific sociotechnical systems. Information and communication 
technologies are contributing to altering the ways in which wars are being fought but these 
changes remain too variegated and uncertain for them to be encapsulated under a single 
movement, let alone one that can be conveniently steered to the benefit of a single party, 
particularly when such technologies are so widely accessible and relatively inexpensive. 
 
We can, however, benefit from an appreciation of the ideological function that talk of an 
RMA serves within wider socio-cultural imperatives. In this respect, Jeremy Black’s 
assessment remains particularly insightful: 
 
Belief in the RMA [is] symptomatic of a set of cultural and political assumptions 
that tell us more about modern Western society than they do about any objective 
assessment of military options […] The RMA acts as a nexus for a range of 
developments and beliefs, including an unwillingness to accept conscription, a 
very low threshold for casualties, an assertion of Western superiority, and the 
ideology of machinism (Black 2003: 97). 
 
In other words, technology is seen as the means by which the United States and its allies can 
continue to exert military influence globally while avoiding both the human casualties and 
compulsory enlistment such a policy might otherwise entail and which have become deeply 
unpopular with their populations since the Vietnam War. Indeed, Western policy-makers 
have become increasingly sensitive to both the wider public’s reduced tolerance of casualties 
(the so-called “body-bag syndrome”) and the resistance that mandatory conscription would 
                                                 
10
 According to one estimate, “in 1944 it took 108 B-17s dropping 648 bombs to destroy a target. In Vietnam 
similar targets required 176 bombs. Today, a single PGM [Precision Guided Munition] can destroy the target” 
(Rip and Hasik 2002: 213). 
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likely encounter today. In this regard, the recent turn to drones for the prosecution of the 
Global War on Terror is merely the latest expression of the aspiration to  a technicist fix for 
this bind, appearing to provide yet another means to “project power without projecting 
vulnerability” (Chamayou 2015: 12).11  
 
This ideological investment in the power of technological contraptions to resolve the inherent 
tensions within the geopolitical designs outlined above may well be precisely that which 
condemns the RMA and its avatars to repeated failures to live up to their inflated promises. 
The more Western states attempt to pursue “riskless wars” (Shaw 2005) through the 
application of technology, the more they render themselves susceptible to, and indeed invite, 
the strategic response of their adversaries to make conflict as costly in human lives as 
possible, including for the civilian populations these states purport to secure. In the words of 
General Stanley McChrystal, former Commander of Coalition forces in Afghanistan (Rose 
2013):  
 
To the United States, a drone strike seems to have very little risk and very little 
pain. At the receiving end, it feels like war. Americans have got to understand 
that. If we were to use our technological capabilities carelessly […] then we 
should not be upset when someone responds with their equivalent, which is a 
suicide bomb in Central Park, because that’s what they can respond with. 
 
War is a clash of wills, Clausewitz wrote almost two hundred years ago (1976: 13). To expect 
wars to be fought only on the terms dictated by a single side is quite simply to wish away the 
agency of such an opposing will. There is little to suggest that any technology is likely to 
fulfil such a yearning any time soon, however much faith in this vision satisfies the 
ideological requirements of Western societies. 
 
More so than in any other sphere of social existence, the brute physicality of war confronts us 
with the pervasive role that material objects occupy in the life (and death) of human 
collectives. But while the rapid and dramatic changes in the practices of warfare experienced 
in the modern era can be directly correlated to the evolutions of technique, we should be wary 
of simplified linear accounts that all too hastily read developments on the battlefield as 
incipient to the character of specific technical objects. It is only when these are related back 
                                                 
11
 Drone strikes offer the added benefit that the physical elimination of individuals designated as threats to 
Western security does away with the seemingly insuperable problem created by the capture and detention of 
“unlawful combatants”. 
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to the wider sociotechnical assemblages in which they are embedded that we can begin to 
draw out the complex interdependencies and co-constitutive interactions that make up the war 
machine. Such an intellectual endeavour can contribute to developing more sober and 
nuanced appreciations of the transformative potential of technological developments than 
those which have animated RMA enthusiasts and at times intoxicated policy-makers. And as 
remote a prospect as it might seem today, it may also be one of the necessary preliminaries to 
the war machine’s eventual disassembly. 
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